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The Menace of Neutrality in Religion 
Gabriël A. Moens.∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Those who are even remotely interested in spiritual matters know 
that organized religions in the United States (and indeed throughout 
the Western world) are in turmoil and that church attendance is 
declining rapidly.1 The turmoil is a consequence, at least in part, of 
the seeming inability (or unwillingness) of the leaders of organized 
religions to support the moral foundations and tenets of their own 
faiths when these come into conflict with the demands and 
expectations of an increasingly secular world. Additionally, some 
religious leaders have largely lost their ability to act as role models 
because their personal moral standards sometimes deviate from those 
religions. The avalanche of child sex abuse scandals that now engulfs 
some religions illustrates this particularly poignantly.2 
There is, however, another factor that contributes to the 
societal decline with respect to religion. This factor, a legal one, 
relates to the interpretation of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, which states in relevant part, “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof . . . .”3 The Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause are, at least potentially, in conflict with each other.4 
This conflict arises from the possibility that a person’s constitutional 
right to the free exercise of religion may be impeded by a 
∗ Professor of Law and Foundation Head, Graduate School of Law, The University of 
Notre Dame Australia; Visiting Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham 
Young University 1995–96; Visiting Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans School 
of Law 2002–03.  
 1. E.g., Frank Bruni, Faith Fades Where It Once Burned Strong, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2003, at A1; Frank Bruni, Mainline Christianity Withering in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2003, at A1.  
 2. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Scandals in the Church: The Overview; Abuse Scandal Has 
Ended, Top Bishop Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at A1. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 4. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 
ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 298 (2002).  
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governmental desire to adhere to the Establishment Clause. The 
Supreme Court has struggled to strike the right balance between 
these two clauses. This continuing struggle, which has spawned the 
Court’s development of the “neutrality principle,” is vital to an 
understanding of First Amendment jurisprudence.5 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause as 
requiring or involving the application of the neutrality principle.6 
This principle imposes an obligation on federal and state 
governments to refrain from favoring or disfavoring either 
sectarianism or secularism.7 Accordingly, governmental hostility 
towards religion violates the neutrality principle because it elevates 
secularism and demeans religion.8 The converse also applies because 
governmental preference for religion adversely affects secularism.  
This Article argues that the neutrality principle ineffectively 
addresses the conflicts between the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause and has largely removed religion from American 
public life by trivializing its existence. In particular, I will argue that 
the application of the neutrality principle trivializes religion because 
it reduces the significance of religion in the United States by largely 
removing it from the public arena. In addition, and more 
importantly, when the neutrality principle is used to protect religion, 
this protection is only achieved by deconstructing the concepts of 
religion and by removing the religious nature, characteristics, or 
significance of a relevant act or symbol. Thus, I will argue that rather 
than protecting religion, the neutrality principle often serves to 
demean it in American society. As such, the neutrality principle is a 
convenient but ultimately specious principle—one that is inherently 
incapable of facilitating the free exercise of religion as 
constitutionally protected by the First Amendment. I suggest that a 
 5. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004) (citing cases discussing this 
tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses). 
 6. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 848 
(1995). 
 7. The Free Exercise Clause is applicable to the states, even though its terms make it 
applicable only to federal action. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940); 
DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 21–25 (2003).  
 8. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“[The First] Amendment 
requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used 
so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.”). 
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return to the original meaning of the Establishment Clause would 
help prevent this negative treatment of religion in the United States. 
The Supreme Court developed the neutrality principle primarily 
during the last few decades.9 However, earlier tests used by the 
Court to determine the constitutionality of relevant laws and 
practices may be interpreted as variants of this principle.10 In Part II 
of this Article, I recount briefly the separation of church and state 
doctrine, followed in Part III by a description of the development of 
the neutrality principle and its manifestations or variants in the 
relevant jurisprudence. Part IV follows with an assessment of the 
impact of the application of the neutrality principle on religion in 
American society. Finally, in Part V, I provide some suggestions on 
how the menace of neutrality may be overcome. 
II. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 
A. The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause 
In the United States, the concept of religious freedom emerged 
in the founding period and has continued to exist in various forms 
ever since.11 The Framers of the Constitution were familiar with the 
centuries of persecution in Europe of religious groups not 
established by the state. Most of the early settlers were escaping 
religious persecution in Europe when they immigrated to the 
American colonies to start a new life.12 At that time, the fear of 
religious persecution justified the popularity of the doctrine of 
separation between church and state. Among others, the Puritans 
preached that government or political influence upon religion would 
taint the faith of the settlers.13 Roger Williams, for instance, 
addressed the issue of the separation of church and state in his 
eloquent metaphor of the wilderness and the garden.14 For Williams, 
the garden was the place of God’s people—those of faith; outside the 
 9. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 848; Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).  
 10. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
 11. Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original 
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2000).  
 12. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1424–26 (1990); see also Carter, supra note 4, at 297–98.  
 13. Carter, supra note 4, at 295. 
 14. Id. at 296. 
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garden was the unevangelized world or wilderness. His idea was to 
construct a hedge to separate the two worlds and protect religion 
from the state.15
At the time the Constitution was drafted, religion represented 
one of the most important influences in the lives of the American 
people—it permeated their every thought and action.16 Any decision 
made by government was expected to have a religious background or 
dimension due to the prevailing morals of the decision makers of 
that time.17 Although American state legislatures in the 1770s and 
1780s drafted constitutions providing for the protection of religious 
worship, religious tests for public office were common and some 
states maintained a system of general assessment of religions.18 The 
Founders were aware of the power and importance of religion in the 
lives of people. They knew that religion could not be separated from 
decision makers’ thought processes. In incorporating the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses into the Constitution, the 
drafters did not intend to trivialize the role that religion played in the 
United States; rather, they sought to prevent the establishment of a 
state-sponsored church.19 Following the understanding of separation 
between church and state at that time, the Founders aimed to 
protect religion from the state,20 not the state from religion, as the 
Supreme Court has recently held.21 Thomas Berg suggests that, 
although the religion clauses of the First Amendment do not reveal a 
specific underlying theory about how the state should treat religion, 
 15. Id. 
 16. Conkle, supra note 11, at 4. 
 17. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 44 (2002) 
(referring to George Washington’s statement that “Religion and Morality are the essential 
pillars of Civil Society”).  
 18. THOMAS C. BERG, THE STATE AND RELIGION IN A NUTSHELL 44–56 (1998).  
 19. Carter, supra note 4, at 294 (claiming that the “Protestant separatists believed in 
dividing church from state, not God from state”); see, e.g., Conkle, supra note 11, at 4–5 
(discussing the interrelatedness of Christian and American history). But see, e.g., Steven G. Gey, 
When Is Religious Speech Not “Free Speech”?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 387 (arguing that the 
Framers were primarily concerned with preventing seemingly “tolerant expression[s] of 
religious views” from becoming an attempt to “indoctrinate and coerce”); Steven K. Green, Of 
(Un)Equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality and 
Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111, 1125 (2002) (arguing that Madison interpreted the 
religion clauses as preventing governmental support of any religion, believing that “liberty and 
republican government would be furthered through ‘the multiplicity of sects’” (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison))).  
 20. Carter, supra note 4, at 294. 
 21. Conkle, supra note 11, at 5–6. 
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the view that “religious belief should not be compelled but . . . 
government may support [religious belief] in ways short of 
coercion”22 is perhaps the most credible from a historical perspective. 
B. Everson: The Wall Between Church and State 
In the United States, the doctrine of strict separation of church 
and state became part of First Amendment jurisprudence in 1947 
when the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Everson v. Board 
of Education.23 Justice Black’s opinion for the Court expressed the 
doctrine as follows: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a 
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or 
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person 
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any 
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever 
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state 
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in 
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.24
Justice Black also stated that “[t]he First Amendment has erected 
a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and 
impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.”25 In 
disallowing government aid of all religions, the majority preempted 
an interpretation of the Establishment Clause that would condone 
the aid of all religions as long as they are treated equally. Presumably, 
this interpretation of the Establishment Clause would be unworkable 
because, in addition to making judgments on “equal treatment,” it 
would also require judicial pronouncements as to what constitutes a 
religion, which is a daunting task at best and discriminatory at worst. 
Nevertheless, Justice Black’s separation of church and state doctrine 
is unable to hide the natural tension between the First Amendment’s 
Free Exercise and Establishment clauses. This tension stems from the 
 22. BERG, supra note 18, at 53 (discussing this and other views on the Framers’ intent). 
 23. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 24. Id. at 15–16. 
 25. Id. at 18. 
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fact that governmental indifference to religion and the absence of 
government aid may prevent people from exercising their 
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. Indeed, some 
government assistance may be necessary to facilitate the exercise of 
constitutional rights. The inherent tension between the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause explains the Supreme Court’s 
development of various tests since 1947, each of which aim to 
mitigate the effects of the strict separation of church and state 
doctrine as espoused in Everson.26
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE 
A. A History of the Neutrality Principle: Variants on a Theme 
1. The Lemon test 
Although the neutrality principle is arguably of recent vintage, a 
review of the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence reveals its long 
pedigree. The principle may be traced to the Court’s decision in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman.27 In Lemon, the Court developed one of the 
most durable tests for analyzing purported violations of the 
Establishment Clause. Lemon involved a Pennsylvania statute that 
allowed the state to reimburse participating nonpublic schools for 
expenses incurred in providing certain educational services pursuant 
to purchase-of-service contracts with the state.28 According to the 
terms of the contracts, the schools were to provide teachers, 
textbooks, and instructional materials for mathematics, modern 
foreign languages, physical science, physical education courses, and 
other secular courses of instruction.29 The question in Lemon was 
whether church-affiliated schools could also take advantage of this 
program.30 The Supreme Court answered the question in the 
negative and, in the process, developed the Lemon test for 
 26. See Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 
760 (1973), in which the Supreme Court declared that “[i]t has never been thought either 
possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation.”  
 27. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 28. Id. at 609–10. In Lemon, the Court also addressed a Rhode Island statute that 
directly paid private school teachers for teaching secular subjects. Id. at 607. 
 29. Id. at 609. 
 30. Id. at 610–11. 
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determining the constitutionality of such statutes: “First, the statute 
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.’”31
The Lemon test, in a real sense, constitutes a version of the 
neutrality principle, because if the purpose or effect of a law or 
practice is to favor religion, or if the state would be entangled with 
religion, the balance would shift to sectarianism at the expense of 
secularism. In requiring laws to have a secular purpose, the Lemon 
test aims at restoring that balance. However, this test often impedes 
the free exercise of religion because, when focusing on the effect of 
the relevant law, any indirect state involvement with religion may be 
held to violate the Establishment Clause. As such, the Lemon test in 
reality becomes an extreme version of the neutrality principle if its 
application results in a failure to accommodate the role and 
significance of religion in American society. As McConnell, Garvey, 
and Berg have argued, “[T]he point is that accommodations of the 
free exercise of religion necessarily ‘favor’ religion over nonreligion, 
in violation of the Establishment Clause as interpreted in Lemon.”32 
That the Lemon test fails to accommodate religious observance led 
Justice Scalia, in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School 
District,33 to liken the Lemon test to “some ghoul in a late-night 
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, 
after being repeatedly killed and buried” and “stalks our 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little 
children.”34 Similarly, but perhaps less expressively, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, referring to the Lemon test, opined that “it bristles with 
hostility to all things religious in public life.”35
 31. Id. at 612–13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 
(1970)).  
 32. MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 17, at 281.  
 33. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 34. Id. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 35. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (disputing the majority’s holding that a school district’s policy of allowing 
invocations at high school football games by a student selected by the student body is 
unconstitutional).  
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2. The endorsement test 
The Supreme Court has never overruled the Lemon test. But the 
perceived or real difficulties associated with its application explain, at 
least in part, attempts by members of the Court to reinterpret the 
test or even to develop other tests which more closely resemble their 
preferred understanding of the neutrality principle. Justice 
O’Connor reinterpreted the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon 
test, in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,36 as prohibiting 
state “endorsement” of religion. She suggested that the purpose 
prong of the Lemon test be reinterpreted as prohibiting government 
from intentionally communicating a message of endorsement.37 
Along the same lines, the reinterpretation of the effect prong forbids 
government action, whether intended or not, that is deemed to 
objectively convey a message of endorsement or disapproval.38 Thus, 
the endorsement test requires an investigation into “whether the 
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or 
disapproval of religion”39 and whether the relevant law or practice 
“sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community.”40 If so, the Establishment 
Clause has been violated.41
The endorsement test was later applied by Justice Blackmun in 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU.42 In this case, the Court declared 
unconstitutional a freestanding display of a nativity scene on the 
main staircase of a county courthouse, but upheld the display of a 
Jewish menorah that stood next to the city’s Christmas tree and was 
accompanied by a statement saluting liberty. Justice Blackmun held 
that, unlike the Court’s holding in Lynch, the crèche sent a message 
of official endorsement to nonbelievers.43 This was held to constitute 
a violation of the neutrality principle because the endorsement of a 
Christian symbol results in favorable treatment of religion at the 
expense of secularism.44 The display of a Jewish menorah, on the 
 36. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 37. Id. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 38. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 39. Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 40. Id. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 687–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 42. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 43. Id. at 621. 
 44. Id. at 601. 
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other hand, was upheld because, according to Justice Blackmun, the 
combined display of a tree, a sign saluting liberty, and a menorah 
simply recognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the 
same winter holiday season, which have attained a secular status in 
American society.45 Hence, if the Christmas tree and the sign distract 
from the display of the menorah, the neutrality principle is not 
violated.  
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
White and Scalia, regarded both displays as constitutional. Justice 
Kennedy rejected the endorsement test because it “reflects an 
unjustified hostility toward religion.”46 For Justice Kennedy, the 
Court’s religion decisions  
disclose[d] two limiting principles: government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and 
it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, 
give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact 
“establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do 
so.”47 
He also stated that “it borders on sophistry to suggest that the 
‘“reasonable”’ atheist would feel less than a ‘“full membe[r] of the 
political community”’ every time his fellow Americans recited, as part 
of their expression of patriotism and love for country, a phrase he 
believed to be false.”48 Justice Scalia, in an insightful statement about 
the endorsement test, commented that it is a “strange notion, that a 
Constitution which itself gives ‘religion in general’ preferential 
treatment [under the Free Exercise Clause] forbids endorsement of 
religion in general.”49
3. The neutrality principle 
The Supreme Court first announced the neutrality principle as 
such in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of 
 45. Id. at 620. 
 46. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).  
 47. Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). 
 48. Id. at 673 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (alterations in original) 
(citations omitted in original). 
 49. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 400 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring).  
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Virginia.50 In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia (University), a 
state instrumentality, authorized payments from its Student Activities 
Fund (SAF) to outside contractors to cover the printing costs of a 
variety of publications issued by student groups.51 However, the 
University withheld authorization for payments to a printer for 
Rosenberger, of Wide Awake Productions (WAP), on the ground 
that, contrary to SAF guidelines, the journal had religious editorial 
content.52 In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that this action 
represented viewpoint discrimination because it required University 
officials to scan and interpret student publications to ascertain their 
underlying philosophic assumptions respecting religious theory and 
belief.53 The University argued that this viewpoint discrimination was 
justified to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause.54 However, 
the Court reasoned that the viewpoint discrimination, in effect, 
elevated secularism over sectarianism. This discrimination constituted 
a denial of the right of free religious speech that risked “fostering a 
pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the 
very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires.”55 In developing 
the neutrality principle, the Rosenberger majority fashioned a variant 
of the Lemon test that allows government action, the purpose or 
effect of which is secular and neither advances nor inhibits religion. 
In contrast, the dissent argued that the majority approved direct 
funding of core religious activities by an arm of the state and 
therefore condoned a violation of the Establishment Clause.56 They 
focused on the publication’s religious orientation as the relevant 
characteristic justifying denial of financial benefits that would 
otherwise have been available.57 However, in disallowing payments 
from SAF, the dissenters condoned a form of discrimination in favor 
of secularism, which would have breached the majority’s neutrality 
principle. Ultimately, Rosenberger stands for the proposition that 
government aid that indirectly benefits religion is acceptable because 
it ensures the neutral treatment of secularism and sectarianism. 
 50. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 51. Id. at 824. 
 52. Id. at 827. 
 53. Id. at 845. 
 54. Id. at 846. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 864–65 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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The Supreme Court’s neutrality approach to the First 
Amendment is reinforced by its public access jurisprudence, which 
deals with the access of religious groups to public facilities. 
According to this jurisprudence, the exclusion of a religiously 
affiliated group from a public facility constitutes a policy favoring 
secularism, and thus violates neutrality. Thus, in Board of Education 
v. Mergens, the Court overturned a decision by a local board of 
education to reject a student’s request for permission to form a 
Christian student club, which, like other clubs, would have had 
access to the school’s facilities after school hours.58 The Court held 
that “a school that permits a student-initiated and student-led 
religious club to meet after school, just as it permits any other 
student group to do, does not convey a message of state approval or 
endorsement of the particular religion.”59 Indeed, the rejection of the 
student’s request had the effect of violating the neutrality principle 
by excluding a religious club from using school facilities after school 
hours, thereby effectively elevating secularism over sectarianism. 
The holding in Mergens was followed by Lamb’s Chapel,60 where 
the Court similarly applied the neutrality approach. In this case, the 
Court held that preventing a church from showing a religiously 
oriented film series on family values and childrearing after hours on 
school premises violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. 
The Court pointed out that permitting school district property to be 
used for the screening of the film would not constitute an 
establishment of religion under Lemon.61 The Court held that there 
is “no realistic danger that the community would think that the 
District was endorsing religion or any particular creed” in view of the 
fact that the films were not scheduled for screening during school 
hours, were not sponsored by the school, and were open to the 
public.62
The neutrality principle was also strongly endorsed in Capitol 
Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,63 where Justice Scalia, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas, held that “[r]eligious expression cannot violate the 
 58. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
 59. Id. at 252. 
 60. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).  
 61. Id. at 395. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
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Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in 
a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and 
open to all on equal terms.”64 In Pinette, the Establishment Clause 
was not violated by a religiously neutral policy that permitted a 
private party (the Ku Klux Klan) to display an unattended religious 
symbol (a cross) in a traditional public forum located next to the 
local seat of government.65 Hence, the Court held that the First 
Amendment protects the government’s neutral treatment of private 
religious expression. In permitting public access that confers 
incidental benefits upon religion, the Court further demonstrated its 
adherence to the neutrality principle.66
One of the most recent public access jurisprudence cases is Good 
News Club v. Milford Central School,67 where New York authorized 
local school boards to adopt regulations governing the use of their 
school facilities. Milford Central School regulations provided that (1) 
“district residents may use the school for ‘instruction in any branch 
of education, learning or the arts,’” and (2) “the school is available 
for ‘social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment events, 
and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community, provided 
that such uses shall be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the 
general public.’”68 Good News, a private Christian organization for 
children ages six to twelve, submitted a request to the interim 
superintendent of the district for permission, in accordance with 
Milford’s policy, to hold the club’s weekly after-school meetings in 
 64. Id. at 770. 
 65. Id. 
 66. This interpretation of the neutrality principle is compatible with the “purpose 
approach” used by the Supreme Court to ascertain the constitutionality of legislation under the 
Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment. Indeed, in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), Justice Scalia, delivering the 
opinion of the Court, held that a generally applicable law, the purpose of which is not to 
discriminate against religion, is constitutional even if it indirectly infringes on a person’s 
freedom of religion. Id. at 877–79; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (invalidating a city’s ban on the ritual slaughter of animals 
because the background, specific language, and exemptions of the ban indicated that its 
purpose was to suppress a central element of the Santeria religion). Conversely, the application 
of the “neutrality principle” by the Supreme Court in an Establishment Clause context 
indicates that if the purpose of the law or practice is not to establish religion it will be held 
constitutional even if it indirectly confers a benefit on religion. See Gabriël A. Moens, Church 
and State Relations in Australia and the United States: The Purpose and Effect Approaches and 
the Neutrality Principle, 1996 BYU L. REV. 787, 792–802. 
 67. 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 68. Id. at 102 (citations omitted). 
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the school cafeteria. Milford denied the request on the ground that 
the policy prohibited use of the facilities by any individual or 
organization for religious purposes.69
The Court addressed whether Milford infringed the Good News 
Club’s free speech rights, and if so, whether this infringement was 
justified by Milford’s desire to avoid violating the Establishment 
Clause.70 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas held that “Milford’s 
exclusion of the Good News Club based on its religious nature [was] 
indistinguishable from the exclusion” in Lamb’s Chapel and 
Rosenberger, and that it “constitute[d] viewpoint discrimination.”71 
The finding of viewpoint discrimination was based on the hostility 
directed against the content of the message of the Good News 
Club.72 The Court indicated that it is necessary to examine the 
regulated speech or activity in order to conclude that viewpoint 
discrimination is involved: 
 Just as there is no question that teaching morals and character 
development to children is a permissible purpose under Milford’s 
policy, it is clear that the Club teaches morals and character 
development to children. For example, no one disputes that the 
Club instructs children to overcome feelings of jealousy, to treat 
others well regardless of how they treat the children, and to be 
obedient, even if it does so in a nonsecular way. Nonetheless, 
because Milford found the Club’s activities to be religious in 
nature—“the equivalent of religious instruction itself”—it excluded 
the Club from use of its facilities.73
Justice Thomas held that viewpoint discrimination was not 
justified by a desire to avoid violation of the Establishment Clause 
because allowing the Good News Club to use the facilities of the 
school would have ensured the application of a neutral, evenhanded 
government policy.74 After finding that neutrality was “‘a significant 
factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of [an] 
 69. Id. at 104. 
 70. Id. at 112. 
 71. Id. at 107. 
 72. Id. at 111. 
 73. Id. at 108 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 507 (2d 
Cir. 2000)). 
 74. Id. at 114. 
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Establishment Clause attack,’”75 Justice Thomas affirmed that access 
to the school would strengthen the neutrality principle: 
 Milford’s implication that granting access to the Club would do 
damage to the neutrality principle defies logic. For the “guarantee 
of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, 
following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits 
to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious 
ones, are broad and diverse.” The Good News Club seeks nothing 
more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about 
the same topics as are other groups. Because allowing the Club to 
speak on school grounds would ensure neutrality, not threaten it, 
Milford faces an uphill battle in arguing that the Establishment 
Clause compels it to exclude the Good News Club.76
4. The “coercion” test 
Justice Thomas also considered the “coercion test” in Good News 
Club. According to this test, the government may not coerce a 
person, either physically or mentally, into attending or participating 
in religious activities. This test is a variant of the neutrality principle 
used by the Supreme Court to ensure that laws and government 
practices do not disfavor secularism and thereby elevate 
sectarianism.77 The coercion test is exemplified in Lee v. Weisman.78  
In Lee, the Court considered whether a religious exercise (a 
nonsectarian prayer) could be conducted at a middle school 
graduation ceremony where the graduates were required to either 
 75. Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 
(1995)); see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (“In distinguishing between 
indoctrination that is attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, [the Court has] 
consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range 
of groups or persons without regard to their religion.”); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 
578 (1987) (holding a Louisiana law unconstitutional that proscribed the teaching of 
evolution as part of the public school curriculum, unless accompanied by a lesson on 
creationism).  
 76. Milford, 533 U.S. at 114 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839). 
 77. Justice Thomas considered the coercion test when he asked “whether the 
community would feel coercive pressure to engage in the Club’s activities.” Id. at 115. He 
refused to apply the test in the circumstances of this case because the relevant community to 
consider for the purposes of the test is the community of parents, not elementary school 
children. He concluded that “[b]ecause the children cannot attend without their parents’ 
permission, they cannot be coerced into engaging in the Good News Club’s religious 
activities.” Id.  
 78. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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tolerate the prayer or not attend their own graduation.79 The Court 
held that the school district’s supervision and control of the 
ceremony placed subtle and indirect pressure on attending students 
to stand as a group or maintain respectful silence during the 
invocation and benediction and, in effect, endorsed a religious 
observance.80 The Court relied on the principle that “at a minimum, 
the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone 
to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in 
a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith or tends 
to do so.’”81 The Court concluded that “primary and secondary 
school children” may not be placed “in the dilemma of [either] 
participating [in a religious ceremony], with all that implies, or 
protesting.”82 Lee reveals that the neutrality principle is simply a 
generalized version of the coercion test. The majority in Lee thought 
that the practice, in effect, preferred religion at the expense of 
secularism.83
B. The Newest Wave of Neutrality Decisions 
1. Zelman: neutrality and free choice 
There is a line of cases that deals with the distribution of 
government funds to eligible people who are required to spend these 
funds for certain approved purposes—most notably education. Is the 
Establishment Clause violated if these funds are used by some 
 79. Id. at 583. 
 80. Id. at 593. 
 81. Id. at 587 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 
(1984)).  
 82. Id. at 593. 
 83. Lee is consistent with other Supreme Court decisions both before and since that 
time. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (finding that a school 
district’s policy of permitting, but not requiring, prayer initiated and led by a student at high 
school football games constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause, because “at a 
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or 
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which . . . ‘tends to do so’” 
(quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 587)); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating 
government-sponsored reading of at least ten verses from the Bible); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421, 435 (1962) (holding that school prayers are unconstitutional because “each separate 
government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official 
prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the 
people choose to look to for religious guidance”).  
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recipients to purchase education in church-affiliated schools? 
Certainly, a plausible argument could be made that the neutrality 
principle is violated if the effect (or even purpose) of the distribution 
of government funds is to advance religion (thereby violating the 
Lemon test) or endorse sectarianism. Also, such a governmental 
scheme may arguably violate the coercion test in that the distribution 
of government funds, in a subtle way, coerces parents to seek 
education in a church-affiliated school for their children. However, 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence indicates that if the funds are 
made available to eligible applicants the neutrality principle is not 
violated by parents’ decision to purchase education, even religious 
education, of their own choosing. Presumably, the rationale for this 
jurisprudence stems from the belief that free choice will enhance the 
neutrality principle, because direction to use the funds only in public 
schools would deny parents free choice and adversely impact 
sectarianism while elevating secularism. 
The Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests,84 which are all 
variants of the neutrality principle, found recent expression in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.85 Zelman dealt with the Cleveland 
Scholarship and Tutoring Program, which was adopted by the Ohio 
Legislature in 1996 after thirty years of desegregation litigation and 
 84. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), Justice Kennedy, writing for 
himself and Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, suggested that, in order to establish a violation of 
the Establishment Clause, religious endorsement is not sufficient but would have to be 
accompanied by “proselytization” or “coercion.” Id. at 659–61 (Kennedy, J., concurring and 
dissenting). Neither the endorsement test nor the coercion test has been completely adopted 
by a majority of the Supreme Court. In Allegheny, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, 
held that  
[a]n Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only ‘coercive’ practices or overt 
efforts at government proselytization, but fails to take account of the numerous 
more subtle ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or 
convey a message of disapproval to others, would not, in my view, adequately 
protect the religious liberty or respect the religious diversity of the members of our 
pluralistic political community. 
Id. at 627–28 (citations omitted). He added that a requirement to show “coercion, even 
indirect coercion, as an essential element of an Establishment Clause violation would make the 
Free Exercise Clause a redundancy.” Id. at 628. Therefore, “any Establishment Clause test 
limited to ‘direct coercion’ clearly would fail to account for forms of ‘[s]ymbolic recognition or 
accommodation of religious faith’” that may also violate the Establishment Clause. Id. 
(quoting id. at 661 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). For Justice Kennedy, the endorsement test is 
flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice because, if “applied without artificial 
exceptions for historical practice,” it would invalidate many traditional practices that recognize 
the role of religion in American society. Id. at 670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 85. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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education reform programs had failed to improve the Cleveland City 
School District. The scholarship payments were available in the form 
of checks payable to the parents, who designated the school to which 
the checks would be sent. In order to ensure that the money was 
spent on education, the parents were required to go to the school 
and endorse the checks. The respondents, Ohio taxpayers, argued 
that the program created public perception of state endorsement of 
religion.86
The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, held that “the Ohio 
program is neutral in all respects toward religion” and that neutral 
educational assistance programs that offer aid directly to a broad class 
of individual recipients defined without regard to religion are 
constitutional.87 The Court characterized the Establishment Clause 
as a provision that “prevents a State from enacting laws that have the 
‘purpose’ or ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion.”88 In this 
case, there was no question that the purpose of the program was 
secular in nature and that it provided “educational assistance to poor 
children in a demonstrably failing public school system. Thus, the 
question presented [to the Court was] whether the Ohio program 
nonetheless ha[d] the forbidden ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting 
religion.”89 The Supreme Court applied the holding of Mueller v. 
 86. Id. at 643–48. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected these claims, stating that 
“[w]hatever link between government and religion is created by the School Voucher Program 
is indirect, depending only on the ‘genuinely independent and private choices’ of individual 
parents, who act for themselves and their children, not for the government.” Simmons-Harris 
v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 209 (Ohio 1999) (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the 
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)). The Ohio Supreme Court concluded “that the School 
Voucher Program has a secular legislative purpose, does not have the primary effect of 
advancing religion, and does not excessively entangle government with religion.” Id. at 211. 
The plaintiffs then obtained a ruling in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
that the program violated the Establishment Clause. Disagreeing with the Ohio Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that money only flows to religious institutions as a result of genuinely 
“independent and private choices of recipients,” Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 
834, 864 (N.D. Ohio 1999), the district court held that the program unconstitutionally 
“advance[d] religion” because the overwhelming majority of schools from which a student may 
choose were sectarian and because no adjacent public school had chosen to participate in the 
program. Id. at 847–49. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the 
“program ha[d] the primary effect of advancing religion . . . in violation of the Establishment 
Clause.” Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 961 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 87. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653. 
 88. Id. at 648–49 (citations omitted). 
 89. Id. at 649. 
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Allen,90 where it had rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a 
Minnesota program that authorized tax deductions for various 
educational expenses, including private school tuition costs, even 
though the vast majority of beneficiaries were parents whose children 
attended sectarian schools.91 In Zelman, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
commenting on the Minnesota program in Mueller, stated that 
because “the program was one of true private choice, with no 
evidence that the State deliberately skewed incentives toward 
religious schools,” it “survive[d] scrutiny under the Establishment 
Clause.”92 Chief Justice Rehnquist further reminded his readers that 
true private choice programs have been held constitutional in the 
past: 
While our jurisprudence with respect to the constitutionality of 
direct aid programs has “changed significantly” over the past two 
decades, our jurisprudence with respect to true private choice 
programs has remained consistent and unbroken. Three times we 
have confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral 
government programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of 
individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or 
institutions of their own choosing. Three times we have rejected 
such challenges.93
 90. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
 91. Id. at 403. 
 92. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 650; see Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400 (“The historic purposes of 
the Clause simply do not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately 
controlled by the private choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial 
schools from the neutrally available tax benefit at issue in this case.”).  
 93. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649 (citations omitted) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203, 236 (1997)). Justice Rehnquist specifically noted Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School 
District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993), where the Court upheld payment of a salary by a school district to 
a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student attending a Roman Catholic high school, and 
observed that the challenged program “‘distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 
“disabled.”’ Its ‘primary beneficiaries’ . . . were ‘disabled children, not sectarian schools.’” 
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651 (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10, 12). In Zobrest, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist held that “government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of 
citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment 
Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial 
benefit.” Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8; see also Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 
U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a statute that authorized payments to visually handicapped 
persons for vocational rehabilitation services, even if the recipient used these payments to pay 
tuition at a Christian college). The Supreme Court recently decided Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 
1307 (2004), another funding case. Unlike Zelman and the cases Chief Justice Rehnquist cites 
therein, in Locke the Supreme Court found constitutional a state law that prohibited using state 
scholarship funds for devotional theology degrees. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
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The Chief Justice further indicated that the program was 
constitutional because it “[was] neutral in all respects toward 
religion. It [was] part of a general and multifaceted undertaking by 
the State of Ohio to provide educational opportunities to the 
children of a failed school district.”94 The only preferences involved 
in this program were “preference[s] for low-income families, who 
receive greater assistance and are given priority for admission at 
participating schools.”95 “There are no ‘financial incentive[s]’ that 
‘ske[w]’ the program toward religious schools. Such incentives ‘[are] 
not present . . . where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, 
secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion . . . .’”96 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist responded to the suggestion that “even without a 
financial incentive for parents to choose a religious school, the 
program creates a ‘public perception’” of state endorsement of 
religion:97
But we have repeatedly recognized that no reasonable observer 
would think a neutral program of private choice, where state aid 
reaches religious schools solely as a result of the numerous 
independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the 
imprimatur of government endorsement. . . . Any objective 
observer familiar with the full history and context of the Ohio 
program would reasonably view it as one aspect of a broader 
undertaking to assist poor children in failed schools, not as an 
endorsement of religious schooling in general.98
The Supreme Court also rejected an attack on the 
constitutionality of the Ohio program on the ground that it coerced 
parents into sending their children to religious schools. It 
emphasized that there was no coercion involved in the program, 
because it provided a wide range of options for Ohio schoolchildren, 
including religious schools.99 Chief Justice Rehnquist summed up 
the majority opinion as follows: 
In sum, the Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to 
religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of 
 94. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231). 
 97. Id. at 654.  
 98. Id. at 654–55. 
 99. Id. at 655–56. 
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individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a 
particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise 
genuine choice among options public and private, secular and 
religious. The program is therefore a program of true private 
choice. In keeping with an unbroken line of decisions rejecting 
challenges to similar programs, we hold that the program does not 
offend the Establishment Clause.100
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence emphasized that a program of 
genuine choice satisfies the endorsement test. In particular, her 
decision to concur rather than join the majority opinion was based 
on her belief that the Court’s decision did not mark a dramatic break 
from past Establishment Clause decisions and that the policy was 
neutral.101 Justice O’Connor noted that the Court’s recent 
Establishment Clause decisions had clarified “the basic inquiry when 
trying to determine whether a program that distributes aid to 
beneficiaries, rather than directly to service providers, has the primary 
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or, as [she] put it, of 
‘endors[ing] or disapprov[ing] . . . religion.’”102 For her, the Court’s 
task was to consider whether the program administers aid in a 
neutral fashion and whether the beneficiaries had a genuine choice 
between religious and nonreligious organizations. If the answer to 
either question had been in the affirmative, then she would have held 
that it satisfied the Establishment Clause.103 She referred to Justice 
Black’s opinion in Everson, where he stated that “the ‘[First] 
Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with 
groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the 
state to be their adversary.’”104 She then proceeded to deconstruct 
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in which he rejected the Court’s 
notion of neutrality, proposing that the neutrality of a program 
should be gauged not by the opportunities it presents, but rather by 
its effects.105 Justice O’Connor argued that, although the criteria 
 100. Id. at 662–63. 
 101. Id. at 663 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 102. Id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (second and third alterations in original) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691–92 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 103. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that “[i]f the answer to either query is ‘no,’ 
the program should be struck down under the Establishment Clause”). 
 104. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 
(1947)). 
 105. Id. at 670 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
MOE-FIN 7/3/2004 1:48 PM 
535] The Menace of Neutrality in Religion 
 555 
 
used to identify the beneficiaries of an aid program might have the 
effect of advancing religion by creating a financial incentive to 
undertake religious indoctrination, this effect is not present where 
“‘aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither 
favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious 
and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.’”106 In such a 
case, the aid does not have the effect of advancing religion. 
2. Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court’s most recent funding decision  
As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in Locke v. Davey.107 In Locke, the Supreme Court 
upheld as constitutional a Washington State scholarship program 
that made funds available to students at accredited schools in the 
state for any course of study except devotional theology.108 The 
respondent, Joshua Davey, argued that the program violated his 
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion because the 
scholarship funds could not be used to support his preferred course 
of study—devotional theology—at his preferred accredited 
institute.109 
Locke poses interesting questions regarding the relationship 
between the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First 
Amendment because the exclusion of devotional theology degrees 
from Washington’s otherwise inclusive scholarship program might be 
perceived as impacting an eligible student’s free exercise of religion, 
even if the exclusion aims at avoiding a violation of the 
Establishment Clause. Washington based the exclusion of devotional 
theology from its scholarship program on Article I, Section 11 of its 
state constitution, which states, “No public money or property shall 
 106. Id. at 653–54 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203, 231 (1997)). Agostini held that the presence of a public employee on private school 
property does not create an impermissible link between government and religion and overruled 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (invalidating New York’s system for delivering 
financial assistance to educationally deprived children in low-income areas); see also Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (invalidating a regulation of the University of Missouri at 
Kansas prohibiting the use of University facilities for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching). 
 107. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). 
 108. Id. at 1308. 
 109. Id. at 1311. 
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be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.”110  
The Court’s decision in Locke is surprising for at least two 
reasons. First, it is incompatible with the free choice line of cases 
exemplified in Zelman, according to which the neutrality principle is 
violated if a governmental program adversely impacts sectarianism 
and elevates secularism. Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized Zelman’s 
continuing validity in Locke when he stated that “the link between 
government funds and religious training is broken by the 
independent and private choice of recipients.”111 Second, the Court’s 
decision in Locke conflicts with Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc., which stands for the proposition that a program is 
presumptively unconstitutional if it is not facially neutral with respect 
to religion.112 This would be the case if the program’s purpose were 
to discriminate against a religion by imposing a burden on it. 
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist decided that the facts of Locke 
lend themselves to the application of a “‘play in the joints’” 
principle: “there are some state actions permitted by the 
Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise 
Clause.”113 The Court found that states, consistent with this 
principle of play in the joints, could, under Zelman,114 and Witters,115 
provide scholarship funds for religious education, but that they need 
not do so.116 In addition, the Court held that Washington’s 
constitutional prohibition of spending government money on 
religious education provided a substantial basis for excluding 
devotional theology.117  
If the implementation of the neutrality principle requires the 
neutral, equal treatment of secularism and sectarianism, then the 
principle is violated if a government program imposes a burden on 
religion which is not placed on secularism. If one disregards the 
principle of play in the joints and reinstates the principle of 
neutrality, the scholarship program would undoubtedly be 
 110. Id. at 1312 n.2 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11). 
 111. Id. at 1311. 
 112. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 113. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311. 
 114. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 115. 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
 116. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312. 
 117. Id. at 1315. 
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unconstitutional under Zelman and the free choice line of cases. 
Also, under the purpose approach of Lukumi, the scholarship 
program, to the extent that it prohibits the use of the funds for the 
study of theology, would be unconstitutional as violating the 
guarantees under the Free Exercise Clause. Justice Scalia specifically 
emphasized this point in his dissenting opinion in Locke. Referring to 
Lukumi, he reminded his readers that the majority of the Court had 
held in that case that “[a] law burdening religious practice that is not 
neutral . . . must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny, and that the 
minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on 
its face.”118 He continued:  
When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that 
benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on 
religion are measured; and when the State withholds that benefit 
from some individuals solely on the basis of religion, it violates the 
Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had imposed a special tax.119 
He emphasized that “[i]f the Religion Clauses demand neutrality, we 
must enforce them, in hard cases as well as easy ones.” He was joined 
by Justice Thomas, who wrote individually to emphasize the valid 
point that “the study of theology does not necessarily implicate 
religious devotion or faith” because such study may be undertaken 
from a secular perspective as well as from a religious one.120
3. Recent application of the neutrality principle at the circuit court 
level 
a. Glassroth: the Ten Commandments case. One of the most 
controversial decisions of 2003, in terms of community reaction and 
media exposure, is the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Glassroth v. 
Moore.121 This case is an interesting example of the implementation 
of the Court’s neutrality jurisprudence by lower courts. But more 
importantly, it illustrates the thesis that the neutrality principle has 
the potential to demean the role of religion in the public arena. In 
order to appreciate this theme, a review of the facts of this case is 
essential. 
 118. Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1320 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 121. 335 F.3d 1282 (2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 497 (2003).  
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Chief Justice Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court installed a 
5,280-pound monument of the Ten Commandments in the rotunda 
of the Alabama State Judicial Building “to remind all Alabama 
citizens of, among other things, his belief in the sovereignty of the 
Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church.”122 No 
person entering the main public entrance of the building could avoid 
the monument due to its size and placement.123 The Chief Justice 
denied requests to add a Martin Luther King Jr. monument and an 
atheist display, which would presumably have made the display less 
focused on Judeo-Christian religion.124 He did, however, allow the 
installation of two plaques, one quoting Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
“Letter from Birmingham Jail,” describing the “‘moral law or law of 
God,’” and the other quoting Frederick Douglass’s statement that 
slavery hides man ‘“from the laws of God.’” Chief Justice Moore 
also added a brass plaque of the Bill of Rights.125
The plaintiffs, three attorneys required to enter the State Judicial 
Building, claimed they were offended by the monument because it 
caused them to feel like outsiders.126 They sued Chief Justice Moore 
in his official capacity as the administrative head of the Alabama 
judicial system, claiming his actions violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.127 They sought a declaratory 
judgment that his actions were unconstitutional and an injunction to 
remove the monument from public sight.128 The District Court of 
Alabama concluded that Moore’s actions violated the Establishment 
Clause, because his purpose in erecting the monument was 
nonsecular and because the monument’s primary effect was to 
advance religion.129 The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed. 
Circuit Judge Carnes stated that the Supreme Court has come to 
understand the Establishment Clause to mean  
that “government may not promote or affiliate itself with any 
religious doctrine or organization, may not discriminate among 
persons on the basis of their religious beliefs and practices, may not 
 122. Id. at 1284. 
 123. Id. at 1292. 
 124. Id. at 1287. 
 125. Id. at 1287–88. 
 126. Id. at 1284. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1299–1300 (M.D. A1a. 2002). 
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delegate a governmental power to a religious institution, and may 
not involve itself too deeply in such an institution’s affairs.”130 
Chief Justice Moore, in his arguments before the court, stressed 
that the First Amendment language that “Congress shall make ‘no 
law’” does not require government officials to refrain from taking 
action respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.131 Chief Justice Moore, in emphasizing the “no 
law” language of the First Amendment, contended that it 
“proscribes only laws, which should be defined as ‘. . . rule[s] of civil 
conduct . . . commanding what is right and prohibiting what is 
wrong.’”132 He claimed that the Ten Commandments monument 
“does neither,” and is merely “‘a decorative reminder of the moral 
foundation of American law.’”133 The court found that, if it took this 
position offered by Chief Justice Moore, nothing would prevent him 
or those with similar ideologies from “adorn[ing] the walls of . . . 
courtroom[s] with sectarian religious murals and hav[ing] decidedly 
religious quotations painted above the bench.”134 Furthermore, the 
court referred to County of Allegheny v. ACLU,135 where the 
Supreme Court “held unconstitutional the placement of a crèche in 
the lobby of a courthouse.”136 Allegheny, the court stated, “stands 
foursquare against the notion that the Establishment Clause permits 
government to promote religion so long as it does not command or 
prohibit conduct.”137
Chief Justice Moore also argued that the monument only 
depicted the moral foundation of secular duties.138 The importance 
of this argument stems from the fact that there could not be a 
violation of the Establishment Clause if the monument is “secular” 
in nature. However, the court, in rejecting this argument, relied on 
 130. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1293 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 
590–91 (1989)). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 1294. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 492 U.S. 573. 
 136. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1294 (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 612). 
 137. Id. (citing Allegheny, 491 U.S. at 609). 
 138. Id. at 1286. 
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Stone v. Graham,139 where the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Ten 
Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and 
Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular 
purpose can blind us to that fact.”140 The court noted that any 
attempt to show a valid secular purpose would be belied by Chief 
Justice Moore’s own words that the purpose of the monument is to 
acknowledge the overruling power of God over the affairs of men 
and “to remind all who enter the [State Judicial] [B]uilding that ‘we 
must invoke the favor and guidance of Almighty God.’”141 The court 
also concluded that the monument conveyed a message of 
endorsement of religion because the appearance, location, and 
setting of the monument “contributed to ‘the ineffable but still 
overwhelming holy aura of the monument.’”142 Moreover, as Chief 
Justice Moore had campaigned under the banner of the Ten 
Commandments, a reasonable observer certainly could have 
concluded that the state was advancing, endorsing, or preferring 
Christianity.143
Glassroth confirms that courts will apply the neutrality principle 
or one of its variants in order to ascertain whether the Establishment 
Clause has been violated. It also illustrates that the application of the 
principle results in the trivialization of religion in American society 
 139. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring a copy 
of the Ten Commandments to be posted on the wall of each public school classroom). 
 140. 1d. at 41 (footnote omitted). 
 141. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 
1297, 1312 (M.D. Ala. 2002)). 
 142. Id. at 1297 (quoting Glassroth, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1303–04). 
 143. Id. (“[A] reasonable observer would ‘find nothing on the monument to de-
emphasize its religious nature, and would feel as though the State of Alabama is advancing or 
endorsing, favoring or preferring, Christianity.’” (quoting Glassroth, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 
1304)). On August 27, 2003, the monument was finally removed from the State Judicial 
Building, one week after the deadline set by the district court. See Associated Press, Ten 
Commandments Moved from Alabama Courthouse (Aug. 28, 2003), http://channelonenews 
.com/news/2003/08/28/at_tencommandments. Chief Justice Moore’s response to the 
removal was the following: “It is a sad day in our country when the moral foundation of our 
laws and the acknowledgement of God has to be hidden from public view to appease a federal 
judge.” Id. The purpose of Chief Justice Moore’s acts was to restore religion to the forefront 
of life from the chasm of neutrality into which it had fallen. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1296. The 
removal of the monument stirred the emotions of those affected by its presence, creating an 
automatic connection between church and state, which cannot easily be removed by order of a 
judge. Chief Justice Moore has since been relieved by the State Judicial Committee of his 
position on the court for disobeying the order of a federal court judge. Laura K. Womble, 
Move It or Lose It, AUBURN PLAINSMAN (Nov. 20, 2003), http://www.theplainsman.com/ 
vnews/display.v/ART/2003/11/20/3fbc8e1521b08. 
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by removing a religious monument from the public arena. In 
addition, any attempt to secularize the monument by stressing that it 
merely constituted a decorative reminder of the moral foundation of 
the American legal system would have diminished the monument’s 
religious message. 
 
b. Newdow: the Pledge of Allegiance case. Another recent case has 
caused an equal amount of controversy in both the religious and 
political worlds: the Pledge of Allegiance case, Newdow v. U.S. 
Congress.144 In Newdow, an atheist father of a student attending a 
public elementary school in the California Elk Grove Unified School 
District (EGUSD) claimed that his daughter was injured when she 
was “compelled to ‘watch and listen as her state-employed teacher in 
her state-run school [led] her classmates in a ritual proclaiming that 
there is a God, and that our’s [sic] is “one nation under God.”’”145 
In accordance with state law and a school district rule, EGUSD 
teachers began each school day by leading their students in a 
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance. In particular, the California 
Education Code required public schools to start “each school day 
with ‘appropriate patriotic exercises’” and specified “that ‘the giving 
of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of 
America . . . satisf[ies]’ this requirement.”146 In order to implement 
this statute, the EGUSD adopted a policy requiring that “‘[e]ach 
elementary school class [shall] recite the pledge of allegiance to the 
flag once each day.’”147 The pledge, codified in 1942, was amended 
in 1954 to insert the phrase “under God” after the word “nation” in 
order to further patriotism and to counter godless communism.148
 144. 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (2003) (specifying that the Supreme Court will address whether 
the plaintiff has standing and whether the district’s policy violates the Establishment Clause). 
Oral arguments are calendared for March 24, 2004. See http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/ 
257/2422/12jan20041425/www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars
/monthlyargumentcalmarch2004.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). 
 145. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 601 (alterations in original). 
 146. Id. at 600 (quoting CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (West 1989)). The Pledge of 
Allegiance was originally written in 1892. Jill Noelle Cecil, Third-Graders Discuss God’s Role in 
Pledge, LEAF-CHRONICLE (Dec. 7, 2003), http://www.theleafchronicle.com/news/stories/ 
20031207/localnews/780583.html. 
 147. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 600 (second alteration in original). 
 148. See id.; Associated Press, Court Refuses to Reconsider Pledge Decision (Feb. 28, 
2003), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-02-28-pledge_x.htm. 
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Judge Goodwin of the Ninth Circuit relied on the principle that 
“‘[t]he government must pursue a course of complete neutrality 
toward religion.’”149 In discussing the Establishment Clause issues, 
Judge Goodwin first reminded readers of the applicable tests: 
Over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has used three 
interrelated tests to analyze alleged violations of the Establishment 
Clause in the realm of public education: the three-prong test set 
forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman; the “endorsement” test, first 
articulated by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion in 
Lynch, and later adopted by a majority of the Court in County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU; and the “coercion” test first used by the Court 
in Lee.150
Judge Goodwin further stated: “We are free to apply any or all of 
the three tests, and to invalidate any measure that fails any one of 
them.”151 In analyzing the endorsement test, he held: 
 In the context of the Pledge, the statement that the United 
States is a nation “under God” is an endorsement of religion. It is a 
profession of a religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism. . . . 
To recite the Pledge is not to describe the United States; instead, it 
is to swear allegiance to the values for which the flag stands: unity, 
indivisibility, liberty, justice, and—since 1954—monotheism.152
The Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wallace v. Jaffree,153 and specifically Justice O’Connor’s concurrence. 
In Wallace, the Court invalidated an Alabama statute that authorized 
a one-minute period of silence in public schools for meditation or 
voluntary prayer.154 Justice O’Connor stated that, because the 
“purpose and likely effect [of the statute] is to endorse and sponsor 
voluntary prayer in the public schools,” the statute violated the 
endorsement test and, hence, the neutrality required by the 
Establishment Clause.155 Judge Goodwin took up Justice 
O’Connor’s neutrality theme when he reasoned in Newdow that 
“‘[t]he government must pursue a course of complete neutrality 
 149. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 608 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985)). 
 150. Id. at 605 (citations omitted). 
 151. Id. at 607. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 472 U.S. 38. 
 154. Id. at 40. 
 155. Id. at 67. 
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toward religion.’”156 For him, neutrality cannot be achieved in a case 
where allegiance is to be sworn to any deity or no deity at all. 
Furthermore, Judge Goodwin stated that the school district conveys 
“a message of state endorsement of a religious belief when it requires 
public school teachers to recite, and lead the recitation of, the 
current form of the Pledge.”157
Judge Goodwin went on to discuss past Supreme Court rulings, 
such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, where the 
Court found unconstitutional a school district’s wartime policy of 
punishing students who refused to salute the flag and recite the 
Pledge of Allegiance.158 In Barnette the Court stated, “If there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.”159 Hence, the Ninth 
Circuit came to the conclusion that “[t]he Pledge, as currently 
codified, is an impermissible government endorsement of religion 
because it sends a message to unbelievers ‘that they are outsiders, not 
full members of the political community.’”160 
Judge Goodwin also concluded that the school district’s policy 
and the 1954 amendment to the pledge failed the coercion test. 
Using the language of the Supreme Court in Lee, he observed that 
“‘[w]hat to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable 
request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a 
school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an 
attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious 
orthodoxy.’”161
The Ninth Circuit then applied the Lemon test, first investigating 
whether the legislation has a secular purpose. Examining the 
historical context, the court determined that “the primary purpose of 
the 1954 [amendment] was to advance religion, in conflict with the 
first prong of the Lemon test.”162 At the time, the inclusion of “under 
 156. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 608 (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60). 
 157. Id. 
 158. 319 U.S. 624, 626 n.2 (1943). 
 159. Id. at 642. 
 160. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 608 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 161. Id. at 608–09 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992)). 
 162. Id. at 609. 
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God” was meant by the government to inveigh against the atheistic 
communist threat.163 The only secular purpose claimed by the 
government was to “solemniz[e] public occasions, express[] 
confidence in the future, and encourag[e] the recognition of what is 
worthy of appreciation in society.”164 The court found this argument 
flawed because it looked at the pledge as a whole rather than just the 
1954 addition of “under God.”165 When the Lemon test is applied 
and the legislative history of the amendment examined, the language 
reveals that its purpose “was to take a position on the question of 
theism, namely, to support the existence and moral authority of 
God,”166 thereby rejecting atheistic and materialistic concepts. Such a 
purpose violates the Establishment Clause. The Ninth Circuit 
determined that since the amendment fails the purpose prong of 
Lemon, it did not need to discuss the other prongs.167
The court also found that the school district’s policy failed the 
Lemon test, even if the EGUSD had a secular purpose in fostering 
patriotism, because the policy constitutes an endorsement of 
religion.168 “Given the age and impressionability of 
schoolchildren . . . particularly within the confined environment of 
the classroom, the policy is highly likely to convey an impermissible 
message of endorsement to some and disapproval to others of their 
beliefs regarding the existence of a monotheistic God.”169 
Accordingly, the court concluded “that (1) the 1954 Act adding the 
words ‘under God’ to the Pledge, and (2) EGUSD’s policy and 
practice of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge, with the added words 
included, violate the Establishment Clause.”170
Justice Fernandez, concurring and dissenting, stressed the 
importance of the neutrality principle when he disagreed with the 
majority’s understanding of the Establishment Clause: 
 We are asked to hold that inclusion of the phrase “under God” 
in this nation’s Pledge of Allegiance violates the religion clauses of 
the Constitution of the United States. We should do no such 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 610. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 611. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 611. 
 170. Id. at 612. 
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thing. We should, instead, recognize that those clauses were not 
designed to drive religious expression out of public thought; they 
were written to avoid discrimination.  
 We can run through the litany of tests and concepts which have 
floated to the surface from time to time. Were we to do so, the one 
that appeals most to me, the one I think to be correct, is the 
concept that what the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
require is neutrality; that those clauses are, in effect, an early kind 
of equal protection provision and assure that government will 
neither discriminate for nor discriminate against a religion or 
religions.171
Judge Fernandez opined that the danger that “under God” in 
the Pledge of Allegiance will result in the establishment of a 
theocracy or will suppress somebody’s beliefs is de minimis. For 
Judge Fernandez, phrases such as  
‘under God’ and ‘In God we Trust’ have no tendency to establish a 
religion in [the United States] or to suppress anyone’s exercise, or 
non-exercise, of religion, except in the fevered eye of persons who 
most fervently would like to drive all tincture of religion out of the 
public life of our polity.172
Thus, in Newdow both Judge Goodwin and Judge Fernandez 
agreed that the neutrality principle should govern their analysis, but 
they clearly disagree on the application of this principle to the facts 
of the case. Judge Goodwin found that even though the students 
were not forced to recite the pledge, the amended 1954 version 
conveyed a message of state endorsement of religion, specifically of 
monotheism.173 Likewise, he found that the policy and the 
amendment fail the coercion test because they place students in the 
untenable position of choosing between participating against their 
will or protesting.174 When he applied the purpose prong of the 
Lemon test, Judge Goodwin found that the addition of the phrase 
“under God” to the pledge did not have a secular purpose but a 
religious one.175 In contrast, Judge Fernandez opined that, in 
 171. Id. at 613 (Fernandez, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 614 (Fernandez, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 607. 
 174. Id. at 608. 
 175. Id. at 611–12. 
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removing the phrase “under God” from the pledge, the majority “do 
so at the price of removing a vestige of the awe we all must feel at 
the immenseness of the universe and our own small place within it, 
as well as the wonder we must feel at the good fortune of our 
country.”176 Judge Fernandez’s opinion, in effect, is a reminder that 
Newdow serves as yet another example of how the implementation by 
courts of the neutrality principle in Establishment Clause cases 
trivializes the role of religion in the United States. In holding that 
the policy and the law are unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit 
decided that the religious climate, which resulted in the amendment 
of the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954, created an entanglement 
between church and state.177 By doing so, the court effectively 
facilitated the relegation of an important aspect of American life to 
meaninglessness by removing its significance from public life.178
The Supreme Court decisions on the neutrality principle and its 
implementation by the Ninth Circuit in Newdow illustrate the use of 
the different variants of the principle. The principle, as illustrated in 
Newdow, has the potential to trivialize the role of religion in 
American society. This potentiality may be referred to as the 
“menace” of neutrality. 
IV. THE MENACE OF NEUTRALITY 
The neutrality principle is based on the idea that “[o]nly a state 
that views itself as a ‘homestead for all citizens’ without committing 
 176. Id. at 615 (Fernadnez, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 177. Id. at 611. 
 178. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held the recital of the Pledge of Allegiance to be 
constitutional. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992). 
Sherman involved an Illinois statute, adopted in 1979, which directed schoolchildren to recite 
the Pledge: “The Pledge of Allegiance shall be recited each school day by pupils in elementary 
educational institutions supported or maintained in whole or in part by public funds.” ILL. 
REV. STAT. ch. 122, ¶ 27-3 (1992) (current version at 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-3 (2003)). 
According to the Seventh Circuit, the Pledge of Allegiance is merely a patriotic exercise and 
hence, is constitutional: “Patriotism is an effort by the state to promote its own survival, and 
along the way to teach those virtues that justify its survival.” Sherman, 980 F.2d at 444 
(emphasis omitted). The court reasoned that, in accordance with Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925), the government retains the right to design the curriculum in its schools and 
that people have the right to select private education if they disagree with the government’s 
decisions in this regard. Sherman, 980 F.2d at 445. As the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits 
reached different results on the issue of the constitutionality of reciting the Pledge of 
Allegiance, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (2003). 
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itself to the . . . contents of [any] one religion or creed can ensure 
freedom of religion for each individual citizen.”179 “The First 
Amendment does not elevate one religion above all others, but 
rather it places all religions on par with one another, and even 
recognizes the equality of religion and non-religion.”180 The 
principle’s premise is that, at least from a constitutional point of 
view, secularism and sectarianism must be treated equally (or 
neutrally). However, the review of cases in Part III of this Article 
reveals that courts, in endeavoring so intently to equalize 
sectarianism and secularism, overlook the consequences of the 
application of the neutrality principle for American society. The 
application of the neutrality principle inherently trivializes and 
degrades religion because it largely results in the removal of religious 
influences from American society. The constitutional separation 
between church and state has become a convenient means by which 
to protect the state against religion. Additionally, the application of 
this principle, and its associated tests, often involves a discretionary 
assessment by courts of relevant facts, thereby turning Establishment 
Clause analysis into nothing more than an exercise or judicial 
conversation in semantics.181 The Glassroth court put it as follows: 
“Challenges under the Establishment Clause have often turned on 
subtle but significant differences. A crèche standing alone is 
constitutionally different from a crèche incorporated into a larger 
holiday display and legislative prayer is significantly different from 
prayer at a high-school graduation.”182
The application of the neutrality principle results in trivializing 
religion to the point of making it irrelevant. The principle has been 
interpreted as requiring the State to be free from religion, rather 
than religion to be free from governmental interference. Although, 
arguably, the use of the neutrality principle was developed to 
 179. Deiter Lorenz, Freedom of Religion—The Legal Situation in Germany 3 (1995) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Brigham Young University Law Review). 
 180. Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1311 (M.D. Ala. 2002); see also County 
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 
(1984) (“[T]he Constitution . . . affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely 
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 
306, 314–15 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948) 
(holding that the First Amendment requires accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all 
religions, and forbids hostility towards any). 
 181. I call this the Supreme Court’s “see-saw approach” to the Establishment Clause. 
 182. 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (citations omitted). 
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safeguard religious liberty, it has instead resulted in a failure to 
protect religion. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has 
the unfortunate consequence of facilitating the emergence of a 
culture of disbelief, making it difficult, if not impossible, to talk 
about religion in the legal context, or to talk about religion at all. 
Use of the neutrality principle has treated religion and religious 
belief as less important facets of the human personality. The recent 
focus on neutrality in issues between church and state, and likewise 
the trivialization of citizens’ religious beliefs, moves counter to the 
philosophies upon which the United States was founded. In 
attempting to protect religion from government and to protect 
government from religion, only the latter has remained powerful in 
any degree.183
The neutrality principle not only has a trivializing effect on 
religion in general, but, more importantly, it also has resulted in 
deconstructing the relevant religious symbol or idea, even when used 
to protect religion (as in the access jurisprudence cases). A good 
example is provided by another Pledge of Allegiance case, decided by 
the Seventh Circuit. Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Newdow, the 
Seventh Circuit in Sherman v. Community Consolidated School 
District 21 decided that the reference to “under God” in the Pledge 
of Allegiance was constitutional.184 However, it came to that 
conclusion only after stripping away all religious meaning from the 
phrase. Indeed, the court opined that the reference is best 
understood as a form of “ceremonial deism” protected from 
Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because it has lost through rote 
repetition any significant religious content.185 The Seventh Circuit 
rationalized that the Pledge of Allegiance is merely a patriotic 
exercise, despite the fact that the objections to its recital concentrates 
on its alleged religious overtones.186 The court quoted Justice 
Brennan in Marsh v. Chambers: 
“I frankly do not know what should be the proper disposition of 
features of our public life such as ‘God save the United States and 
this Honorable Court,’ ‘In God We Trust,’ ‘One Nation Under 
God,’ and the like. I might well adhere to the view expressed in 
 183. See Carter, supra note 4, at 311–12 (discussing the metaphor of the garden). 
 184. 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 185. Id. at 447. 
 186. Id. at 444. 
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Schempp that such mottoes are consistent with the Establishment 
Clause, not because their import is de minimis, but because they 
have lost any true religious significance.”187
Thus, the Seventh Circuit merely mimicked the Supreme Court’s 
relevant jurisprudence, according to which Thanksgiving, Christmas, 
“In God We Trust,” and similar governmental “‘acknowledgements 
of religion serve . . . the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing 
public occasions . . . and encouraging the recognition of what is 
worthy of appreciation in society.’”188
The deconstructive role of the neutrality principle when used to 
protect religious practices is also exemplified by Marsh v. Chambers, 
where the Supreme Court upheld the Nebraska legislature’s practice 
of opening each day’s session with a prayer by a state-paid 
chaplain.189 The Court found that because the prayer was so deeply 
embedded in the history and tradition of the country, it did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.190 In Marsh, the Supreme Court 
overruled the court of appeals, which had held that the chaplaincy 
practice violated all three elements of the Lemon test: the purpose 
and primary effect of selecting the same minister for sixteen years and 
publishing his prayers was to promote a particular religious 
expression, and the use of state money for compensation and 
publication led to unconstitutional entanglement of church and 
state.191 In contrast, the Supreme Court in Marsh relied specifically 
on the fact that Congress authorized legislative prayer at the same 
time that it drafted the Bill of Rights. The Court illustrated its point 
by noting that the practice of opening sessions of Congress with 
 187. Id. at 447 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting)). 
 188. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 189. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 190. Id. at 793–95. The same conclusion was reached in King v. Richmond County, 331 
F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003), regarding a state seal containing a pictograph of the Ten 
Commandments. Furthermore, the Third Circuit determined in Freethought Society v. Chester 
County, 334 F.3d 247, 265–66 (3d Cir. 2003), quoted in Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 
1300 (11th Cir. 2003), that “a new display of the Ten Commandments is much more likely to 
be perceived as an endorsement of religion” than one in which there is a legitimate 
“preservationist perspective.” This case involved an eighty-year-old plaque of the Ten 
Commandments on the outside of the county courthouse; the court distinguished this case 
from the present case due to the lack of attention to the plaque over the past eight decades. Id. 
at 266–67. 
 191. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. 
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prayer has continued without interruption for almost two hundred 
years, ever since the First Congress drafted the First Amendment. 
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated, “Clearly the men 
who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid 
legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that 
Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has 
continued without interruption ever since that early session of 
Congress.”192 If the practice were discontinued because of its 
perceived incompatibility with the Establishment Clause, the Court 
would, in effect, impose more stringent First Amendment limits on 
the states than those contemplated by the draftsmen of the 
Constitution. Hence, the Court concluded that in light of the 
unique history of the First Amendment, there could “be no doubt 
that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has 
become part of the fabric of our society.”193
The same reasoning applies also to the recent Ten 
Commandments case discussed in Part III of this Article. Indeed, 
proponents of the display of the Ten Commandments in the rotunda 
of the State Judicial Building maintained that the Commandments 
are not an inherently religious document because they belong to 
most religions, i.e., they are part of the world’s collective cultural 
history, and, therefore, their display cannot violate the Establishment 
Clause. However, in Glassroth, the court of appeals deflected Marsh 
by referring to some of the most recent cases regarding displays of 
the Ten Commandments and indicated that these have focused on 
the “factual specifics and context” as determinative “when it comes 
to applying the Establishment Clause to religious symbols and 
displays.”194 The court indicated that, as its decision implied nothing 
to situations with different facts, recognitions of God by government 
are not per se impermissible.195 Furthermore, the court invoked the 
well-known statement in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch: 
“Those government acknowledgments of religion [declaration of 
Thanksgiving as a holiday, the national motto on money, and the 
opening of court sessions with reference to God] serve, in the only 
ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular 
 192. Id. at 788. 
 193. Id. at 792. 
 194. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1300. 
 195. Id. at 1298. 
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purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in 
the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of 
appreciation in society. For that reason, and because of their history 
and ubiquity, those practices are not understood as conveying 
government approval of particular religious beliefs.”196
The attempt in Glassroth to “secularize” the monument is 
baffling in any case in view of the fact that the Supreme Court itself 
declared in Stone that the “Ten Commandments are undeniably a 
sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative 
recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.”197 
Thus, in order to shield religious monuments of this nature against 
constitutional attack, it would be necessary to deconstruct the 
religious message they convey. It reinforces what noted philosopher 
Kierkegaard said of the shift towards religious neutrality: “when we 
make of our faith a thing to be defended, we also shrink it to a 
defensible size, and thus remove a part of its power.”198
An interesting phenomenon has emerged as a consequence of 
the trivializing effect that the courts’ neutrality holdings have upon 
the role of religion in American life. During the Glassroth and 
Newdow controversies, huge numbers of people supported the Ten 
Commandments monument and the 1954 version of the Pledge of 
Allegiance, respectively. When the inherently religious essence of 
ideas and symbols is squeezed out of them through adjudication, a 
backlash from those who believe in them is likely to soon follow.  
Glassroth offers a prime example of the validity of this point. 
There are two schools of thought on the presence of the Ten 
Commandments in the Alabama State Judicial Building: those who 
find it appropriate and those who do not. Those who do not support 
the presence of the Ten Commandments in the State Judicial 
Building fear the proximity of so religious a monument to the state 
and in turn are preventing a piece of American legal history from 
being placed in a location which would educate the citizens of 
Alabama. As a consequence, the spirit and importance of a 
document, which has held such influence over American culture and 
the founding of the United States, would be lost. In contrast, those 
 196. Id. at 1301 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 197. 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
 198. See Carter, supra note 4, at 310.  
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who believe it is appropriate may take the perspective that the Ten 
Commandments are merely the secular expression of the moral 
foundation of law in the United States. However, this is a double-
edged sword because, if the Ten Commandments form just another 
code of law, like the Louisiana Code of Evidence or the Internal 
Revenue Code, the meaning behind the Ten Commandments is lost 
as well. Herein lies the menace of the neutrality principle, for religion 
loses under either viewpoint. 
V. OVERCOMING THE MENACE OF NEUTRALITY 
The idea that church and state have different roles in society and 
that respectful separation between them should be maintained is 
essentially a good idea. The Founders of the United States knew that 
accommodation of both religious and nonreligious behavior was 
incompatible with the establishment of a government-sponsored 
church or with preferential treatment of religion.199 However, a 
review of the relevant jurisprudence in this Article reveals that the 
application of the neutrality principle may have a chilling effect on 
religion, either by trivializing the role and significance of religion in 
American society or by deconstructing the relevant religious activity 
or symbol. This effect does not mean that the neutrality principle is 
inherently bad, but that the application of the principle in prior 
Supreme Court cases, as well as several recent decisions, 
disadvantages religion to the point of making it irrelevant. Hence, a 
different version of the neutrality principle needs to be developed in 
order to deflect this effect. This new version should enable religion 
to maintain its significant role in American society and should 
facilitate the exercise by people of their constitutional right to 
exercise their religion. This new version may therefore be called 
“equitable neutrality.” Equitable neutrality does not require religion 
and government to rail against each other in order to keep their 
meaningfulness intact and avoid losing themselves in each other. 
Equitable neutrality could be achieved by returning the 
Establishment Clause to its original meaning, which arguably 
prohibits the government from establishing a state-sponsored church 
or from allocating government funds to churches, but does not 
require the strict separation of church and state.200
 199. See supra note 19 and accompanying discussion. 
 200. See supra note 19 for discussion of some of the theories regarding original intent. 
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The purpose test is the one best suited to analyzing 
Establishment Clause violations. This test requires a determination of 
legislative intent. If it is not the purpose of the law to establish a 
state-sponsored church or to allocate government funds to churches, 
the law should be constitutional, even if it indirectly (or incidentally) 
confers a benefit on religion. The neutrality principle discussed in 
this Article is, to a certain extent, already compatible with this 
purpose approach. For example, in Rosenberger, the Supreme Court 
condoned the giving of indirect government aid precisely because 
the purpose of the payments from the Student Activities Fund was 
not to establish a church or to fund a religious publication.201 
Instead, it merely ensured the neutral treatment of secularism and 
sectarianism. The application of the neutrality principle becomes 
problematic, however, when an investigation into the purpose of a 
relevant law results in a finding of a violation of the Establishment 
Clause in circumstances where there is no governmental intention to 
establish a state-sponsored church or to allocate funds to churches. 
Under my proposed purpose approach, the Establishment Clause 
is violated if religion is entrenched “as a feature of and identified 
with the body politic . . . so as to involve the citizen in a duty to 
maintain it and the obligation . . . to patronize, protect and promote 
the established religion.”202 This interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause facilitates the exercise by people of their constitutional right 
to freedom of religion because any indirect (or incidental) benefit 
enjoyed by them would be constitutional. This benefit does not 
offend the Establishment Clause because no governmental intention 
to create a state church or to allocate funds to a church can be 
ascertained. However, as argued in Part III of this Article, under the 
present neutrality approach, a person’s constitutional right to the 
free exercise of religion is often only protected following a 
deconstruction of religion, thereby demeaning it in public life. The 
advantage of the purpose approach is that any government 
accommodation of religion is constitutional, provided it is not the 
purpose of the law to benefit religion directly by establishing a state 
church or by allocating government funds to churches. Thus, the 
application of this purpose approach would retain and respect the 
 201. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 864 (1995). 
 202. Attorney-Gen. ex rel. Black v. Commonwealth, (1981) 146 C.L.R. 559, 582 (Austl.).  
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religious character of the relevant religious activity or symbol. This is 
equitable neutrality. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The neutrality principle as applied by the Supreme Court and in 
recent circuit court decisions fails to achieve true neutrality and often 
trivializes religion’s role in public life. The notion of equitable 
neutrality, which involves the application of the purpose test in order 
to analyze putative violations of the Establishment Clause, has the 
potential to rectify the courts’ incorrect application of the neutrality 
principle without disadvantaging religion. Were that to happen, the 
roles of religion and government would be separate, but would 
respect each other. This, in turn, would balance both religion and 
the government’s powers so neither would slide into the chasm of 
inconsequence. 
 
